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Abstract—The rapid growth of computer systems which
generate graph data necessitates employing privacy-preserving
mechanisms to protect users’ identity. Since structure-based de-
anonymization attacks can reveal users’ identity’s even when the
graph is simply anonymized by employing naïve ID removal,
recently, k−anonymity is proposed to secure users’ privacy
against the structure-based attack. Most of the work ensured
graph privacy using fake edges, however, in some applications,
edge addition or deletion might cause a significant change to
the key property of the graph. Motivated by this fact, in this
paper, we introduce a novel method which ensures privacy by
adding fake nodes to the graph.
First, we present a novel model which provides k−anonymity
against one of the strongest attacks: seed-based attack. In this
attack, the adversary knows the partial mapping between the
main graph and the graph which is generated using the privacy-
preserving mechanisms. We show that even if the adversary
knows the mapping of all of the nodes except one, the last node
can still have k−anonymity privacy.
Then, we turn our attention to the privacy of the graphs
generated by inter-domain routing against degree attacks in
which the degree sequence of the graph is known to the
adversary. To ensure the privacy of networks against this attack,
we propose a novel method which tries to add fake nodes in a
way that the degree of all nodes have the same expected value.
Index Terms—Graph data, Autonomous System (AS)-
level graph, Inter-domain routing, Privacy-Preserving Mecha-
nism (PPM), anonymization and de-anonymization, structural
attack, Seed-based attack, k−anonymity, k−automorohism,
k−isomorphism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, a huge amount of data is generated from
various different computer systems which can be modeled
by a graph data. Social network data [1]–[4], communi-
cation data [5], Internet peer-to-peer networks and other
network topologies [6], [7], mobility traced-based contact
data [8] are some examples of computer systems and services
which generate graph data. In these graphs, nodes repre-
sent users/systems and edges represent relationship between
users/systems [9].
The necessity of sharing graph data for research purposes,
data mining task, and commercial applications [10] presents
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a significant privacy threat to the users/systems [11] — even
when the graph is simply anonymized — since the adversary
can leverage their side-information about the structural graph
to infer the private information of the users/systems which
generated the graph [11]–[15].
The structure-based attacks have been introduced to graph
data by [11], [12]. The structure-based attacks are aimed to
de-anonymize anonymized users in terms of their uniquely
distinguishable structural characteristics. There are different
kinds of structure-based attacks that can be mainly catego-
rized in the following groups:
• Degree Attacks: Assume the adversary knows the de-
gree sequence of the graph, thus the adversary can use
the degree sequence of the graph to uniquely identify
one user/system if its degree is unique [16], [17].
k−degree anonymity is proposed by [18] in order to
protect graph against this specific attack in a way that
for each node, there exist at least k −1 other nodes with
the same degree.
• 1-Neighborhood Attacks: Assume the adversary knows
the immediate neighbors of the target users, so they
have complete information about the nodes adjacent to
the target node. k−neighborhood anonymity is proposed
by [19] to protect graph against the adversary who has
knowledge about the neighborhood of the target node.
In this privacy mechanism, for each node, there exist
at least k − 1 other users who have same neighbor-
hood. [20], [21] also extend the previous work, to design
an algorithm to defend against the adversary who has
knowledge about the d−neighborhood of a target node.
• Sub-graph Attacks: The sub-graph attack in which the
adversary knows a sub-graph around the target node is
the general case of 1−neighborhood attack. [12], [22],
[23] proposed a method to protect users’ identity from
this specific kind of attack.
• Hub-Fingerprint Attacks: Assume there exist some
hubs with high degree and high betweenness central-
ity [24] in the graph which have been identified in the
released network. Now, assume there exists an adversary
who has knowledge about distance between these sets of
designated hub nodes and a target node, thus they can
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use this knowledge to break the privacy of the target
node.
Zou et al. [25] proposed the concept of k−automorphism
in a way that can provide privacy against all of the above-
mentioned structure-based attacks. Otherwise stated, a graph
is k−automorphic, if for any node in the graph, there exist
k − 1 symmetric nodes based on any structural information
such as their degree, their neighborhood, their distance from
hubs, etc. The utility of this method characterized by using
the number of faked edges added to the graph, thus, this
method is specifically useful when the networks have sym-
metry properties [26]–[28]. However, the privacy mechanism
proposed by [25] didn’t address the privacy of the sensitive
relationship between nodes, and in other words, the graph
can suffer from path length leakage and edge leakage. [29],
[30] showed the path length leakage and edge leakage exist
even when a graph is k−anonymous and k−automorphic.
Cheng et al. [31] proposed a new k−isomorphism privacy
preserving mechanism which preserves the privacy of not
only nodes but also edges. [31] convert the graph into k
disjoint isomorphic sub-graphs and proved each node and
each edges can be identified with the probability of 1k , thus
they satisfy k−anonymity. However, the privacy mechanism
proposed by [31] decreases the utility of the released graph
since the edges between sub-graphs are deleted. In order
to compensate this utility loss, Yang et al. [32] proposed a
graph anonymization method in which the anonymous graph
should satisfy AK−secure privacy preserving mechanism to
minimize utility loss.
Today, knowledge of the adversary is not just limited to
the structural of the graph, but also richer side-information
in the form of seeds is available to them; otherwise stated,
the adversary knows the mapping between the original graph
and the anonymized graph for a subset nodes [17], [33]–[39].
Access of adversary to this side-information, which is diffi-
cult to control, make the previous anonymization technique
more vulnerable. [17], [33]–[39] assume the network graph
is generated using Erdös-Rényi random graph model [40],
which is not a realistic assumption. [15], [41], proposed the
first theoretical quantification of the perfect de-anonymization
of a general setting in which the graph can be generated using
any random model.
The bulk of previous work ensured privacy by deleting or
adding fake edges. In this paper, we turn our attention to the
case that privacy is guaranteed by adding fake nodes. Adding
fake nodes could be a promising scheme to defend the
graph privacy against the adversaries with side-information.
Especially, it is necessary to add fake nodes in cases where
other methods, such as node deletion, edge deletion and
fake edge addition, might significantly decrease the utility of
the released graph. For example, to study the inter-domain
routing in the Internet, the Internet topology is usually
modeled as an Autonomous System-level (AS-level) graph,
where each node represents an Autonomous System (AS)
which is a network operated by an institution and an edge
between two nodes represents that two networks are directly
connected [42]–[47]. In this scenario, the reliability property
of a network to the rest of the Internet and the best path
from one network to another are essential for the study of the
inter-domain routing [7], [48]. Node or edge deletion might
change the best path from one network to another or even
make some networks unreachable from the rest of networks.
Similarly, adding a fake edge between two real networks also
changes the reliability property, since the fake edge leads to
an additional path between two real networks.
In this paper, we proposed a novel method called k−fold
replication method which preserves privacy of systems/users
against seed-based attacks through adding fake nodes to the
graph. Then, we turn our attention to the privacy of the graphs
generated by inter-domain routing against degree attacks in
which the degree sequence of the graph is known to the
adversary. To address this issue, we propose a novel method
which tries to add fake nodes in a way that the degree of all
nodes have the same expected values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the general setting for privacy on graphs: system
model, metrics, and definitions. Then, the conditions for
achieving privacy by adding fake nodes in the case of seeded-
based attack is discussed in Section III. In Section IV, we
discuss how to ensure privacy for the networks using node
addition, and in Section V, we conclude from the results.
II. A GENERAL SETTING FOR PRIVACY ON GRAPHS
In a general setting, we are given a graph G = G(V, E), and
without loss of generality, we write V = {1, 2, · · · n}. Given
a privacy mechanism M which is employed to guarantee
privacy, a new graph Gp(V p, Ep) has been produced. In the
simplest case, we might have Gp ' G or in more advanced
settings, we could construct Gp from G by adding fake
vertices or adding/deleting edges.
The way Gp is constructed from G depends on the privacy
mechanismM which is designed for the specific context, the
constraints and requirements of the problem scenario. There
exists a mapping function, σ : V 7→ V p which is a function
that determines the mapping between vertices of G and Gp .
More specifically, for each vertex v ∈ V , σ(v) ∈ V p is the
corresponding vertex in Gp . The adversary tries to identify
users’ identities by finding the mapping function σ.
Although we assume the privacy mechanism is known
to adversary; the construction of Gp normally involves a
randomized component and this randomness is what ensures
the privacy. Here, we are interested in guaranteeing a privacy
level, and our goal is employing a privacy preserving method
to perturb the original graph structure to protect users’
privacy while preserving as much data utility as possible.
We first briefly review the terminology that we use in this
paper. Note that we adopt the definitions of k−automorphism
and k−isomorphism from [25], [31], [49], [50], respectively.
Definition 1. Graph Isomorphism [49]: Given two graphs
G = (VG, EG) and Q = (VQ, EQ), graph Q is isomorphic to
graph G if there exists a permutation function (Π : VQ 7→
VG) such that (u, v) is in the set of graph edges EG iff
(Π(u),Π(v)) is in the set of graph edges EQ.
Definition 2. k−Isomorphism [31]: A graph G(VG, EG) is
k−isomorphic if graph G consists of k disjoint subgraphs,
i.e., G = G1 ∪ G2 ∪ · · · ,∪Gk , where Gi and G j are isomor-
phic for i , j.
Definition 3. Graph Automorphism [50] :Given graph G =
(VG, EG), it is a graph automorphism from graph G to itself
if there exists an automorphic function (Π : VG 7→ VG) such
that (u, v) is in the set of graph edges EG iff (Π(u),Π(v)) is
in the set of graph edges EG .
Definition 4. k−Automporphism [25]: A graph G(V, E) is
k−automorphic if for any node v in the graph, there exist
k − 1 different automorphic functions.
Here, we assume a strong adversary which employs seed-
based attack which is defined as:
Definition 5. Seed-Based Attack: In this attack, we assume
the adversary knows: (1) The main Graph (G) (or part of
it), (2) The graph which is generated by privacy mechanism
M (Gp), and (3) Partial of mapping function (σ), more
specifically, the adversary knows the values of σ for a subset
V s ⊂ V . The goal of the adversary is to determine the values
of σ for some vertices in V − V s .
Now, before our method is discussed in detail, the mea-
sures of privacy cost and degree of anonymity that we employ
are proposed.
Definition 6. Privacy Cost: The cost of a privacy mechanism
is usually formulated as the distance measure between G and
Gp . In other words, the more we distort G to make Gp , the
more privacy cost we incur.
Privacy metrics could also depend on the situation. One
type of privacy metric can be defined in terms of the
minimum number of vertices that are needed to be revealed
to the adversary (|V s |), so that the adversary can recover the
values of σ for some vertices in V − V s . More specifically,
we can have the following definition.
Definition 7. Privacy Tolerance of Node v: A privacy mech-
anism has a privacy tolerance τv for a vertex v ∈ V , if the
adversary is unable to recover σ(v) unless |V s | > τv . The
largest value of τv that satisfies this property, is said to be
the maximum tolerance of the mechanism for vertex v and
we write
Tv(M) = τv .
The value Tv(M) is specific to a vertex and depends on
the structure of G, so we can provide the following measure
for privacy of the mechanism that does not depend on the
graph G.
Definition 8. Privacy Tolerance: A privacy mechanism has
a privacy tolerance τ if for all graphs G with |V | = n, and all
the vertices v ∈ V s , we have Tv(M) ≥ τ. The largest value
of τ that satisfies this property, is said to be the maximum
privacy tolerance of the mechanism and we write
T(M) = τ.
Clearly, we have T(M) ≤ n − 1. Maximum tolerance
gives some measure of privacy, but it does not provide
all the needed information. More specifically, it does not
give us a measure of the uncertainty of the adversary when
|V s | < Tn(M).
Now, we define privacy function that provides a much
more complete picture about the privacy level of a mecha-
nism. As we will see, the maximum tolerance defined above
can be easily extracted from the privacy function. Intuitively,
the privacy function, hn(Λ), gives us the guaranteed uncer-
tainty about σ(v), when the adversary has labels of Λ vertices
(i.e., |V s | = Λ).
We now provide the formal definition of privacy function
for a privacy mechanism M. Entropy and mutual informa-
tion usually provide an effective tools for defining privacy
measures [51], [52]. If |V s | = Λ, we write
V s = {u1, u2, · · · , uΛ}.
Definition 9. Privacy Function: For a privacy mecha-
nism M, privacy function which is denoted as hn :
{0, 1, 2, · · · , n} 7→ R+ is defined as follows:
hn(Λ) = min
{
H
(
σ(v)σ(u1), σ(u2), · · · , σ(uΛ)) :
|V | = n, |V s | = Λ, v ∈ V − V s
}
,
where H(·|·) denotes the conditional entropy. Note that [53]–
[57] also employed entropy to define degree of anonymity
achieved by the users of a system towards particular attackers.
Note that the minimum is taken over all graphs G with n
vertices, all v ∈ V , and all V s ⊂ V . With this definition, it
easy to see
Tn(M) = min{τ : hn(τ) = 0}.
III. ACHIEVING PRIVACY AGAINST SEED-BASED
ATTACKS
When the Internet is modeled as an AS-level graph, to
preserve the utility of the AS-level graph, the anonymization
scheme should maintain the key properties, such as the
reachability and reliability between networks. In the studies
of the inter-domain routing, it could be essential to figure
out the reliability and the best path from one network to
another [7], [48]. For example, to derive the global routing
table, the best route of each network should be derived based
on the AS-level graph [7].
In an AS-level graph, adding fake nodes into the AS-level
graph introduces additional fake networks. After that, fake
edges can be added between two fake nodes or between a
fake node and a real node. These fake edges represent fake
connections between two networks. Note, we do not add fake
edges between two origin nodes, since it decreases the utility
of the graph.
Adding fake nodes can preserve the utility of an AS-
level graph, since the key properties of the graph can be
maintained. On one hand, the additional fake nodes do not
remove the original paths between two networks in the graph.
Therefore, if a path from a real network to another real
network exists in the original graph, the path always exists in
the generated graph. On the other hand, even if the additional
fake nodes and edges might lead to additional paths from a
network to another, the the export policy of fake nodes can
not altered to guarantee that these additional paths between
two real networks are invalid paths in terms of inter-domain
routing. That is, a fake network will not announce a route
that goes through real networks to its neighboring nodes that
represent real networks. Therefore, a path with any fake edge
will not be a valid route from one real network to another
real network.
In this section, we propose approaches to make a graph
k−anonymized through adding fake nodes. Here, the ad-
versary has side-information not only about the structural
information of the graph, but also in the form of seeds. Now,
since we focus on privacy mechanisms that add fake nodes to
preserve privacy, we use the number of fake nodes to measure
the cost of a privacy mechanism as follows.
Definition 10. Privacy Cost: Given an original graph G and
the generated graph by privacy mechanism Gp , the privacy
cost is defined as the number of fake nodes added to the
original graph, in other words,
Cost
(
G,Gp
)
= |V p | − |V |
.
A. The Naïve Approach
In this method, we generate exactly k − 1 copies of
the original graph to achieve a new graph which satisfies
k−automorphism/k−isomorphism.
As it is shown in Figure 1, the set of nodes of the generated
graph can be defined as:
V p =
{(i, j) : i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}} ,
thus, the privacy cost can be calculated as:
Cost(G,Gp) = (k − 1)n.
Note that the privacy tolerance of this graph which is gen-
erated using Naïve approach is one, in other words, if only
one of the nodes is known to the adversary, the adversary
can recover the whole graph and break privacy of users.
Tn(M) = 1.
Now, by using the fact that the privacy tolerance of this
generated graph is equal to one, we can conclude the privacy
function of the Naïve approach can be calculated as:
hn(Λ) =
{
log2 k, for Λ = 0.
0, for Λ ≥ 1.
Fig. 1: An Example which demonstrates how Naïve approach
is employed to satisfy k−anonymity. First approach satisfies
k−isomorphism by generation k − 1 copies of the original
graph. Second approach satisfies k−automorphism by con-
necting all of the k − 1 copied graphs.
As a result, the "k−anonymity" type approaches to privacy
are not usually sufficient.
B. The Replication Method
Motivated by the above discussions, here we introduce a
technique to guarantee privacy against seed-based attacks.
We call it the replication method, as it can be thought of
as replicating the vertices of the original graph in a special
way. The basic idea is as follows. Start from any vertex in
the graph v1 ∈ G and add a new vertex to the graph which
is connected to all the neighbors of v1. Call the new graph
G1. Now identify another vertex in v2 ∈ G and add a new
vertex in G1 that is connected to all neighbors of v2 in G1.
This will give you G2. Repeat this process until you exhaust
all vertices of G. At the end you will obtain Gn which will
be our graph Gp . This is a two-fold replication method. You
can simply extend this to a k-fold replication by repeating the
whole process k − 1 times. Below we formally introduce the
technique and show that it provides a high guarantee against
seed-based attacks.
The set of nodes of the graph which is generated by k−fold
replication can be defined as:
V p =
{(i, j) : i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n},((i, j), (u, v)) ∈ V p iff ( j, v) ∈ V},
thus, the privacy cost can be calculated as:
Cost(G,Gp) = (k − 1)n,
which is the same as the Naïve method. The number of
fake edges needed in the k−replicated method can be also
calculated as:
∆|E | = |Ep | − |E | = (k2 − 1)|E |.
Note that the privacy tolerance of the graph Tn(M) can be
calculated as:
Tn(M) = n − 1,
in other words, if the adversary knows the mapping function
(σ) for n−1 nodes–which is the maximum possible value for
the privacy tolerance– they still identify the last node with
the probability of 1k , so this method can obtain the maximum
possible value for the privacy tolerance.
Theorem 1. For k−fold replication method, the privacy
function is bigger than or equal to log2 k for the case
Λ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. In other words,
hn(Λ) = log2 k for all Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
Proof. In the first step, we prove that hn(Λ) ≥ log2 k. To do
so, let’s assume the adversary knows the mapping function
for n − 1 nodes, and there is only one unknown node.
Since the replication method creates a k vertices with the
same neighbors, by symmetry, the privacy function can be
calculated as
hn(n − 1) = −
k∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
= −
k∑
i=1
1
k
log2
1
k
= log2 k . (1)
Now, given the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, for all
Λ ≤ n − 1, we have
H
(
σ(v)|σ(u1), σ(u2), · · · , σ(uΛ)
) ≥
H
(
σ(v)|σ(u1), σ(u2), · · · , σ(un)
)
,
and as a result, for all Λ ≤ n − 1,
hn(Λ) ≥ hn(n − 1)
= log2 k . (2)
Now, from (1) and (2), we can conclude the privacy function
for the k−replication method satisfies
hn(Λ) ≥ log2 k for all Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
In the second step, to show that
hn(Λ) ≤ log2 k for all Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1,
it suffices to provide examples of scenarios (for all n and
Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1) where
H
(
σ(v)σ(u1), σ(u2), · · · , σ(uΛ)) ≤ log2 k .
Consider the graph G(V, E), which is shown in Figure 2.
In this graph, there exist n − 1 node with degree of one, and
one node with degree of n− 1. Thus, the degree sequence of
the original graph is equal to
dG = [1, 1, · · · , 1,︸      ︷︷      ︸
n-1
n − 1],
Note that the k−fold replication method, increases degree
of each node by a factor of k, thus, the degree sequence of
graph after k−fold replication is equal to:
dG
P
= [k, k, · · · , k,︸       ︷︷       ︸
k(n-1)
k(n − 1), k(n − 1), · · · , k(n − 1)︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
k
].
This means that in the k−fold replication method, the uncer-
tainty of the adversary about the node which has degree of
n − 1 is always less than or equal to log2 k. Therefore,
hn(Λ) ≤ log2 k for all Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
Fig. 2: A graph with n− 1 node with degree of one, and one
node with degree of n − 1.

The idea behind k−fold replication method is explained
by the following example:
Example 1. Figure 3 shows the replication method for the
case k = 2; namely, two-fold replication. In this example,
number of nodes (n) is equal to 3, thus the privacy cost is
calculated as
Cost(G,Gp) = 3,
and the privacy tolerance of the graph is equal to
Tn(M) = 2.
Thus, the privacy function of this two-replicated method is
equal hn(Λ) = 1 for all Λ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
Fig. 3: Two-fold Replication Method. Black nodes represent
real nodes and red nodes represent added fake nodes. Black
edges represent the real edges, green edges represent the fake
edges which connect a fake node and a real node, and blue
edges represent the fake edges which connect two fake nodes.
IV. PRIVACY OF NETWORKS THROUGH NODE ADDITION
In this section, we want to provide privacy regarding the
Degree Attack. Degree attack is one type of the structure-
based attacks, in which, the adversary knows degree sequence
of the graph, in other words, they know the degree of all
nodes in the graph [18], [22].
In the scenario of the AS-level graph, the degree of each
network can be inferred from publicly available datasets,
such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing information
provided by Route Views project [59] and Routing Infor-
mation Service (RIS) provided by Réseaux IP Européens
Network Coordination Center (RIPE NCC) [60]. The large
networks at the core of the Internet, such as Tier-1 Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), have high degree. Through their
special degrees, the large networks can be easily mapped
to the nodes in the AS-level graph. Then these identified
networks can benefit the follow-up de-anonymization greatly,
since these identified networks will provide a lot of structural
information. When these networks are identified, the privacy
information (routing policies) attached to the nodes will be
disclosed.
Although the privacy schemes in Section III can provide
privacy regarding various structure-based attacks, it incurs
high privacy cost. Namely, k − 1 replications for each real
node are added to the original graph. In this section, we
propose a more efficient privacy mechanism in terms of
privacy cost against degree attack.
A. A General Setting for Privacy Against Degree Attack
The original graph such as power law graph is asymmetric
in terms of degree distribution [61], which reveals a lot of
information to the adversary who has knowledge about de-
gree distribution of the graph data. Assume G(V, E) denotes a
graph data with set of nodes V (|V | = n) , and set of edges E .
Without loss of generality, we assume v ∈ V = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Our main goal is protecting identity of all of the nodes of
this graph from a strong adversary who has full knowledge
about the degree sequence of this graph. Now, assume the
adversary knows the 1 × n vector containing the degree of
node v,
d = [d1, d2, · · · , dn],
where dv denotes degree of node v. In order to preserve the
privacy of nodes, a new random graph called GP is generate
in a way that all vertices have the same expected degree. In
order to have the same expected values for all the vertices, we
add m fake nodes to the original graph (G). U = {1, 2, · · · ,m}
denotes the set of fake nodes; thus, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. Now,
new graph Gp = (V p, Ep) is constructed using probabilistic
method to introduce more uncertainty to the model and as
a result, confuse the adversary more. In this method, fake
edges which connects two fake nodes or one fake node with
one real node randomly; to be more specific,
• Each edge between a real node and a fake node is
included in the graph with probability pvu independent
from every other edge, where v ∈ {1, 2, · · · n} and
u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. There exist n × m different values
for pvu’s.
• Each edge between two fake nodes is included in the
graph with probability quw independent from every
other edge, where u,w ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. There exist (m2 )
different values for quw’s.
Now, as shown in Figure 4, for all real nodes v ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}, the expected value of degree of each real node
after this operation can be calculated as:
E[Dv] = dv +
m∑
u=1
pvu . (3)
Fig. 4: The real node v and its degree after the anonymization
operation is employed to generate the random graph GP . In
this figure, for simplicity, the real edges of the graph is not
shown.
Also, as shown in Figure 5, for all fake nodes u ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,m}, the expected value of degree of each fake node
after this operation can be calculated as:
E[D′u] =
n∑
v=1
pvu +
m∑
w=1
w,u
quw . (4)
Fig. 5: The fake node u and its degree after the anonymization
operation is employed to generate the random graph GP .
Our goal is adjusting the value of pvu’s and quw’s in a way
that identity of users against degree attack will be protected.
Theorem 2. Consider a general graph G(V, E). If all the
followings hold
1) m = n − 2 |E |a , where a is a constant number which is
greater than the maximum degree of original graph.
2) pvu =
a−dv
m , for all v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and u ∈{1, 2, · · · ,m}.
3) qvw = 0, for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and w ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
then, the expected values of all the real and fake nodes have
the same value which is equal to a.
Proof. After adding m fake nodes which each of them is
connected to real nodes with probability of pvu =
a−dv
m , for
all v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the expected value of of degree of each
real node can be calculated by using (3):
E[Dv] = dv + m
(
a − dv
m
)
= a, (5)
Also, for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, by using (4), we have
E[D′u] =
n∑
v=1
pvu +
m∑
w=1
w,u
quw
=
n∑
v=1
a − dv
m
=
na − 2|E |
na−2 |E |
a
= a, (6)
since each fake node is connected to a real node with
probability of pvu =
a−dv
m , and two fake nodes are connected
with probability of quw = 0.
Now, from (5) and (6), we can conclude after this op-
eration, the expected values of all the real and fake nodes
have the same value which is equal to a. Now, since all the
nodes have the same expected values, the adversary gets more
confused. 
V. CONCLUSION
The wide presence of graph data which are generated by
computer systems requires graph-based privacy-preserving
mechanisms. Most of the proposed privacy-preserving mech-
anisms ensure privacy by deleting/ adding edges. However,
adding or deleting edges between two real nodes might sig-
nificantly decrease the utility of the released graph data, thus,
in this paper, we presented graph-based privacy preserving
mechanisms which ensure privacy by adding fake nodes to
the original graph. In the first part of the paper, we proposed
a novel mechanism called k−replication method to protect
the identity of users against one of the strongest attacks
called seed-based attack. In the second part of the paper,
we improve privacy of inter-domain routing against degree
attack by adding fake nodes and edges in a way that the
degree of all nodes have the same expected values.
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